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While currently relocating to a building away from the center of Prague, since 
1995, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) has been headquartered in the former 
Czechoslovakian parliament building. The former President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav 
Havel, invited the radios to move from Munich to Prague and occupy the parliament 
building for a symbolic dollar a year rent. This gesture of historical irony is especially 
appropriate in considering the history of international radio broadcasting: a building 
representative of Communism was converted into the headquarters for radio stations 
extolling the benefits of democratic media. This symbolic move signifies one of the 
paradoxes of the twentieth century: the United States, the major financial contributor to 
RFE/RL, profited from the broadcasting and ideological infrastructure developed by the 
Soviet Union, and the medium intended to unify and spread Communist goals was 
ultimately used against the system and contributed to the downfall of the regime. 
To examine this phenomenon, this paper will consider the beginnings of two 
forms of broadcasting: early Soviet and post-WWII programming by Radio Free Europe 
and Radio Liberty. The importance of broadcasting was recognized from the early days 
of Soviet power. Vladimir Lenin first advocated radio as a tool of national unification in 
order to spread revolutionary ideas to far removed regions and target the illiterate 
population. In the hands of democratic nations, radio transcended political and 
geographical borders and effectively broadcasted information and news that had been 
suppressed by the Soviet Union. RFE/RL's contribution I to the downfall of the Soviet 
regime is an especially compelling example of historical irony, as Soviet Russia was the 
first country to pioneer radio broadcasting for political purposes. Comparing RFE/RL's 
I "Contribution" is used here extremely loosely. There is no statistical analysis, or any convincing fact-based evidence, of the extent to 
which RFE/RL contributed to the dissolution of the USSR. What does exist, however, are theories postulated by scholars, and oral 
interviews from people who lived in the countries in which RFE/RL broadcasted. 
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broadcasting strategies against those of the early Soviet Union uncovers notable overlaps 
even though one broadcasting entity strove to construct a nation and the other to 
deconstruct the political regime. 
This exchange of information and ideas between countries led to a complex 
relationship between international and domestic media and introduced instances where 
the two blurred, combined, and when one served as a surrogate for the other. Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)2 filled the latter role for East European countries 
and the republics of the Soviet Union and performed two important functions: they 
provided their audiences with a democratic worldview by transmitting news silenced by 
the government "at home," and offered a chance for silenced voices (such as exiled 
writers and political figures) to be heard. This presented a double-fronted attack against 
communism. The U.S.  government employed the intellectual emigre population (who had 
been effectively silenced by their native governments), providing them with jobs 
broadcasting back into their home countries, while at the same time transmitting 
democratic ideas of Western origin. 
Comparing early Soviet broadcasting strategies against those of RFE/RL's (and 
American/Western broadcasting in general) uncovers notable overlaps in method, and 
what is ultimately apparent is that propaganda can be packaged in a variety of guises, 
including democracy. After the October Revolution of 1917, Vladimir Ilych Lenin began 
to advocate the unique attributes of the radio as a form of national unification, which he 
continued until his death in 1924. Exploring Lenin's role in the development of Soviet 
2 Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were separate broadcasting stations until 1976. As they are currently referred to as one entity, 
for the sake of clarity for the modem reader, this paper will use the abbreviation RFE/RL when discussing generalities common to 
both stations, and individual abbreviations when their history does not overlap. 
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radio necessitates the use of sources in Russian as the only3 intensive study of Lenin's 
work toward connecting the Soviet Union by radio broadcasts in English is Thomas H. 
Guback and Steven P. Hill's The Innovation of Broadcasting in the Soviet Union and the 
Role of V. I. Lenin. In it, they examine the development of radio in the Soviet Union 
from both political and economic perspectives. T.M. Gorjaeva's Istorija sovetskoj radio-
zurnalistiki (The History of Soviet Radio Journalism) is a collection of primary Russian 
documents outlining the development of radio in Soviet Russia: excerpts from program 
guides, letters from Lenin praising the new form of technology, and descriptions of 
broadcasts moving toward governmental control, in addition to extensive coverage of 
radio references in newspapers and speeches. Yuri Murashov's article "Sovetskii etos i 
radiofikatsiia pis'ma" ("Soviet Ethos and the Radiofication of Letters") considers the 
conversion of radio into the main form of Soviet leisure as a highly important political 
goal. In a more extensive scholarly comparison of the beginning of Soviet radio 
broadcasting and initial transmissions of RFE/RL, Soviet periodicals such as Govorit 
SSSR (Here Speaks the USSR), Govorit Moskva (Here Speaks Moscow), and "hobby" 
radio publications such as Radioljubitel '(Radio Enthusiast) could be used to compare 
Soviet methods of propaganda to those used in the American Crusade for Freedom.4 
There is a wide variety of American overviews of media in the Soviet Union, and 
while most of them are now outdated, they are useful not only in their information, but 
also in the tone in which the information is conveyed. Mark Hopkins' Mass Media in the 
Soviet Union provides a comprehensive view of various media sources--newspaper, 
radio, television--in the Soviet Union, and how they were utilized to accomplish political 
3 As far as I am aware. 
4 A limitation of my research is a lack of Russian sources in Russian. Gorjaeva's compilation of ptimalY sources is a monumental, 
vital resource, but given the opportunity to access archives in Russia would contribute to the span of my research. 
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agendas. Martin Ebon' s The Soviet Propaganda Machine covers all fonns of propaganda, 
and is especially detailed in its coverage of Radio Moscow's World Service, and Soviet 
domestic stations.5 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty scholarship is rather limited in breadth for 
many reasons. Scholars often attribute the absence of extensive scholarship on Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty to the secretive nature of the radios; at one point, the 
radios were funded by the CIA, a fact not known publicly in America at the risk of public 
outcry and fear of the population viewing the radios as merely government-funded 
propaganda. Further, the very nature of radio means that primary documents are limited 
to radio transcripts and recordings, held in Munich, Gennany until fairly recently when 
the Hoover Institution sponsored their move to the Hoover Archives at Stanford 
University.6 Why significant modem scholarship has not emerged as a result of access to 
these archives is unknown, though a new release by the Hoover Institution Press, 
Discovering the Hidden Listener: An Assessment of Radio Liberty and Western 
Broadcasting to the USSR During the Cold War perhaps indicates a movement tovvard 
reviving study of a relatively archaic 7 fonn of communication. 
The existing scholarship specifically pertaining to the history of RFE/RL often 
takes the fonn of personal accounts combined with historical backgrounds, frequently by 
people who have worked for RFE/RL in the past, or in international journalism8 such as: 
Sig Mickelson's America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio 
5 While my paper focuses on the beginnings of each radio (Soviet broadcasting and RFE/RL), further study could be done on how (or 
whether) the two mirrored each other after their idealistic beginnings. 
6 �hile I do not know the full contents of the archives, it can be assumed that the transcripts and recordings are not all in English, and 
whlle
.
many scholars may be polyglots, when the language count goes into the dozens, a comprehensive study of the archives would be 
dauntmg. Even today, RFE/RL broadcasts in 21 countties. 
7 In the age of modem technology, it may perhaps be argued that academic focus on Soviet and Russian media has shifted according to 
rew technological trends: television, the internet, and even blogs. (Strangely enough, I am no exception.) 
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Liberty, Arch Puddington's Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty and Michael Nelson's War of the Black Heavens: The 
Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War. 
What is missing in existing accounts of RFE/RL is a departure from narrative; the 
"stories" of the radios are purely descriptive--they do not analyze the radios as a strategic, 
calculated move against Communism, and especially do not compare the stations to those 
of the Soviet Union. This paper will eschew unnecessary9 anecdotes of the history of the 
radio beyond what is vital for comprehending the complicated past of RFE/RL, and 
instead focus on the duality of its broadcasting, the aforementioned double-fronted attack 
on Communism in which RFE/RL went beyond what international stations like Voice of 
America and the BBC did for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For the sake of 
concision, the timeline focused on in this paper will not follow the entire trajectory of 
RFE/RL history, but rather the beginning of the stations' broadcasts. For future study on 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, access to the Samizdat Archives located in Moscow 
and Munich and the Hoover Archives would provide a comprehensive view of which 
samizdat works were broadcasted as well as important information on programming 
specifics unavailable in current print materials. 
A textbook history of Soviet radio broadcastinglO begins: "Our country is the 
mother of radio,,,ll illustrating that the Soviet Union truly adopted radio as its own 
creation. While the exact location of the first radio broadcast in the world is debated, 
following the Revolution of 1917, Russia proved an especially adept backdrop for the 
9 Unnecessary for the sake of this research paper. The canon of RFE/RL narratives comprises many extremely well-researched and 
interesting books from professionals and scholars who had personal experience with the stations for extended periods of time (and 
especially notewOlthy, in a volatile time in the radios' histories). As my experience with RFE/RL is limited to a summer internship in 
2008, I have no authority to add any additional anecdotal description; rather, I intend to add a new perspective on RFE/RL history. 
10 A Soviet history of soviet radio broadcasting. II Hopkins 244 
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development of international broadcasting. The benefits of radio broadcasting 
complemented the shortcomings of Russia's physical geography: unifying a country of 
such sheer, unwieldy size could be accomplished with broadcasts that did not require 
literacy or production materials (other than transmission technology) to reach the 
population. 
On a symbolic level, radio was instrumental in the project of nation building: it 
encouraged national unity by providing a common, auditory link between people in far 
removed regions and the center: everyone would be able to hear news from Mosco,v, 
regardless of physical distance. Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky wrote a poem cal1 cd 
"Radioagitator,,12 that described radio as an auditory unifier and as the peoples' voice. He 
exclaimed, 13 "What is read in Moscow, you can hear in Archangel'sk!,,14 According to 
Mikhail Epstein, "[Russia] had come to occupy an area so large that finding its place in 
time became somewhat difficult.,,15 Radio negates the limitations of spatial separation, 
and instead relies on the advantages of temporality. The speed of radio waves provides an 
almost instantaneous relay of information, covering the span of the Soviet Union's eleven 
time zones exponentially faster than newspaper distribution ever could. 
Thomas Guback and Steven Hill explain that after the Bolshevik Revolution in 
1917, the new leaders experienced the challenge of bringing a "large, culturally 
amorphous collectivity into a technological, machine-oriented twentieth century.,,16 
Technologically backward and vast, modernizing Russia presented a daunting task. In his 
writings, Lenin demonstrates awareness of the fiscal advantages of radio broadcasts as 
12 Pa)l.HOannaTop: someone who palticipates in radioagitatsia, or propaganda by means of radio broadcast. 13 Pa)l.HOafHTaTop, «Pa)l.HOra3eTa» # 100 (Radioagitator, "Radiogazeta" # I 00) May 3 1925 in GOl]' aeva 108 14 ' " , . «KaK MO)({HO B MocKBe / lIHTaTb, / a H3 ApXaHreJIbCKa / CJrywaTb!» 
15 Michael Epstein. "Russo-Soviet Topoi," in Dobrenko, 297. 
16 Thomas H. Guback, and Steven P. Hill. The Innovation of Broadcasting in the Soviet Union and the Role of V. I. Lenin, (Urbana: 
The University of Illinois, 1972), 10. 
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opposed to published newspaper. In an article in Pravda Lenin wrote, " . . .  there are 
350,000 copies of Izvestia and 250,000 of Pravda for the whole of Russia. We are 
paupers. We have no newsprint.,,17 As a new fonn of communication, radio would 
potentially not only eliminate the paper shortages and the need printed material, but also 
expedite the spread of Soviet revolutionary ideas. Vladimir Dmitrievich Bonch-
Brunevich explains Lenin's aspirations for using radio for the enlightenment of the 
masses: Lenin said "in every village there should be a radio . . .  the country cannot live in 
the dark: the newspapers come very slowly with delays, and now the radio, in our 
condition of destruction, is especially important.,,18 Further, radio was a particularly 
effective way of combining propaganda and agitation (agitprop), which persuaded masses 
and enforced Communist values.19 
Aleksei Mikhailovich Bonch-Bruevich, a leading developer of Soviet radio 
technology, received a personal note from Lenin, outlining the value the first Soviet 
leader placed on radio: "The newspaper without pages and "without distance," that you 
are creating will be an incredible achievement. I promise you my unlimited support in 
this and similar endeavors.,,20 Lenin's conceptualization of radio as an auditory fonn of 
print pervaded far its development. Although Lenin viewed radio as a departure from the 
printed newspaper fonn, he never considered it a separation and programming strongly 
resembled material found in print; in fact, newspapers were often simply read over the 
airwaves. The Central Committee broadcasted two newspapers over the radio :  daily for 
17 Ibid. 17. 18 «8. 11. J1eHHH H pa,Ll,HO» ("Y. I. Lenin and Radio"), in GOljaeva, 308. 
19 Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987), 7. 20 «B. 11. J1eHHH -- M. A. EOH4 EpyeBH4Y» (Y. I. Lenin to M.A. Bonch-Bruevich), in GOljaeva, 18. 
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workers, and 3-4 times a week for peasants.21 The radiogazeta (radio newspaper) 
editorial board was created from the editorial boards of print newspapers, but the unique 
demands of oral newscasts led to the development of radio journalism and different 
strategies of transmitting news. 
The volume of radio broadcasting was frequently described "in terms of 
newspaper pages," even four decades after its conception.22 Rather than a wholly distin(,t 
media form, radio "tended to be viewed as a public address systeln for the printed 
word.,,23 Lenin asserted the value of developing radio in a letter to Nikolai Petrovich 
Gorbunov, calling it an "action of great importance (the newspaper without pages and 
without wires ... ) because all of Russia will listen to the newspaper read in Moscow" and 
demanded that Gorbunov keep him updated of the radio progress at least twice a month. 24 
Lenin charged a radio laboratory in Nizhny Novgorod with the development of a 
central ratio station in Moscow with the capability of broadcasting 2000 verst.25 His 
dedication to the spread of radio can be attributed to his belief that it was "absolutely 
essential that communication facilities be extended with the radiotelephone so that many 
could simultaneously hear a message or announcement.,,26 Five Inillion rubles were 
allotted to the project with the aim of broadcasting the "oral newspaper" by Ineans of 
"loudspeaking telephones" (gromkogovoritel ') on six squares throughout the Moscow.27 
Shortwave radios intended to serve as outlets for in-country information became widely 
available, and thus radio was not broadcasted only publicly, but also within private 
21 «1-13 nOCTaHOBneHI1$1 UK BKn (6) «113,lJ,aHl1e pMl1ora3en> (,'From the Resolution of the Central Committee "Broadcasting of Radio 
Newspapers"), March 22, 1926, in GOljaeva, 27. 22 Mark W. Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union, (New York, NY: Pegasus, 1970), 254. 23 Ibid., 245. 
�: «B . 11. J1eHI1H--H. n. fop6YHOBY, 26 51HBapR 1921 rO,lJ,a» ("V. 1. Lenin--N. P. Gorbunov, January 26, 1921"), in GOljaeva, 19. 3 ,200 km. There are 1.6 kilometers per verst. 26 Guback, Innovation, 12 ' 27 n « O�Ta�OBneHHe COBeTa TpY,lJ,a 11 060PHbI 06 opraHH3aQHI1 YCTHOH ra3eTbI» ("Decree of the Labor and Defense Soviet on the 
Orgamzatlon of the Oral Newspapers"), in GOljaeva, 20. 
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homes. He allotted the radio laboratory two and a half months to complete the project, 
emphasizing the expedited attempts to create sustainable broadcasting in Soviet Russia.28 
Despite the Civil War-induced electric energy shortage in 1 920, Nizhny Novgorod's 
radio laboratory was given high priority: it was never limited in its use of energy 
resources, and the laboratory workers were exempt from the state-wide draft.29 Further, in 
one of Lenin's dictation's to Stalin's (back then, one of the Commissars of the Soviet 
National Council) office, he suggested utilizing financial resources from Soviet Russia's 
National Treasury, which held funds allocated only for emergencies.3o Lenin did not 
limit radio development in terms of energy or monetary funds, and he often exalted radio 
broadcasting as the ultimate force of propaganda. 
In the early days of Soviet Russia, radio occupied the private sector, but as the 
political advantages of radio became apparent and the country entered the Civil War, the 
military commandeered the airwaves.31 During the war, radio stations were subordinated 
to the military command of marine and naval infantry, but radio grew into a more 
multifaceted political tool that both informed and involved the Soviet citizens. The first 
test of radio equipment in Moscow was on August 1 8, 1 922 and soon after, the station, 
known as The Comintem Radio Station, broadcasted its first radio concert.32 On October 
27, the station began operating, though "the official opening was reserved for a special 
occasion, November 7, 1 922, the fifth anniversary of the Revolution.,,33 Lenin's voice 
28 «riOCTaHoBneHHe COBeTa-Pa60LJe KpecThHHcKoH 060pOHhi 0 nOCTpOHKe lJ,eHl'PaJIhHOH pa.nHOTeneQlOHHoH CTaHlJ.HH ,n:eHCTBHH B 
2000 BepCT» ("Decree of the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Defense on Building a Central Radio Station with the Capability of 
Broadcasting 2000 verst"), in Gotjaeva, 17. 
29 Ibid, in GOljaeva, 18. 
30 «DHchMa 8.11. J1eHHHa 11. B. CTaJIHHY MH LJneHOB DOJ1l1T6IOpo IJ,K PDK (0) 0 pa3BHTHH pa.nHOTeXHHKH» ( Letter from V. I. Lenin 
to I. V. Stalin for a Member of the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the Development of Radio 
Technology), in Gotjaeva, 20-21. 
31 «0 ueHTpaJIH3aUHH pa.nHoTexHH4ecKoro ,n:ena COBeTcKoM Pecny6nHKH» ("On the Centralization of Radio Technology for the Soviet 
Republic"), in Gotjaeva, 15. 
32 Guback, Innovation 32. 
33 Ibid., 33. 
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was heard over the air in photograph recordings of his speeches, and radio quickly spread 
throughout Russia. As radio gained importance, its ownership was gradually completely 
transitioned to the state. A decree from the Soviet National Commissars' Council entitled 
"On the Centralization of Radio Technology for the Soviet Republic" outlines the plan 
for transitioning radio to state ownership.34 Through the Commissar of Post Offices and 
Telegraphs, the Department of Radio Technology was created in order to Inaintain 
control over what the radios transmitted. 
The Party further encroached on broadcasting, essentially taking complete control 
over radio stations. In a resolution from the Central Committee, "On Control of Radio 
Broadcasting," the Communist Party asserts that all party committees on all territories 
where stations are located should take control over the work of those stations "and use 
them to the fullest extent in propaganda and educational purposes" as well as "assure 
political correctness of the materials broadcasted.,,35 In order to carry out these goals, 
local Party Committees were instructed to: 
1 .  Designate a responsible Party member as a leader of broadcasting who would 
be responsible for the organizational aspects and the content of all [italics are 
mine] broadcasted materials. This person will report to a relevant Party 
committee. 
2. To establish mandatory [italics are mine] review of the plans and programs of 
all broadcasting by the Party Committees. 
3. Carefully select the presenters and lecturers that participate in radioagitatsia, 
thus creating a politically correct body of broadcasters. 
4. Undertake measures to secure the microphones so that every broadcast will be 
transmitted only with the permission of the responsible leader in charge of the 
station. 
34 0 C « UeHTPaJlH3aUl-IH pa,uHOTeXHHQeCKOrO )1.e.l1a OBeTCKOH Pecny6.11HKH» ("On the Centralization of Radio Technology for the Soviet 
Republic"), in GOljaeva, 15. 
35 «nOCTaHOB.I1eHHe �K BKn (E) «0 PYKOBO)1.CTBe pa,uHoBemaHHeM» ("The Resolution from the Central Committee "On Control of 
Radio Broadcasting""), January 10, 1927, in Gotjaeva, 27. 
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5. Glavlit [the central censorship organization] . . .  should have its designees present 
in all radio transmitting stations. 36 
Rather than just serving as an alternative media outlet to newspapers, radio was 
recognized by the state as an especially vital form of propaganda: the "Central 
Committee .. .  acknowledges the organization of radioagitatsia37 as an extremely important 
and necessary task as a new weapon of propaganda among the masses.,,38 The Central 
Committee announced that rather than just on main city squares, loudspeakers would be 
placed in workers' clubs, peasants' clubs and village libraries. 39 The spread of radio 
extended beyond Moscow and developed through the Soviet Union's periphery, 
"targeting big industrial centers as well as the entire territory of the Soviet Union.,,40 As 
radio expanded outward geographically, it moved inward into the personal lives of 
citizens of the Soviet Union. 
Broadcasting extended beyond the political and infiltrated the personal sphere: the 
general population's interest in radio culminated in the creation of various radio clubs 
(called "Friends of Radio/ Druz 'ia Radio"), uniting people interested in radio technology 
and broadcasting. The Party immediately took special interest in these groups, suggesting 
that the leadership of the organizations be chosen from Party members with appropriate 
technological expertise.41 However, the Party's intentions extended beyond simply 
supplying technical support to hobby clubs, and were in fact quite transparent: the stated 
36 «noCTaHOBJleHHe UK BKn (6) «0 PYKOBO.ll.CTBe pa.n.HoBelll,aHHeM» ("The Resolution from the Central Committee "On Control of 
Radio Broadcasting""), January 10, 1927, in GOljaeva, 27-8. 
37 Propaganda by means of radio broadcasting. 
38 «113 nOCTaHOBJleHHH UK pnK (D) «0 pa,lJ,HOarHTaI.J,HH»» ("From the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian 
COlmnunist Party of Bolsheviks "On Radioagitatsia""), March 2, 1925, in GOljaeva, 25. 
39 Ibid., in GOljaeva, 25. 
40 «113 nOCTaHOBJleHHH UK pnK (6) «0 pa,lJ,HOarHTaI.J,HH»» ("From the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On Radioagitatsia""), June 22, 1925, in GOljaeva, 26. 
41 «UHPKYJlHP UK PKn (6) «0 nOMOlll,H H PYKOBO.ll.CTBe opraHH3al.J,HHMH 06ll1,eCTBa .ll.pY3eH pa.n.HO (O,l1.P)»>> ("On Help and 
Leadership in the Organization of the "Friends of Radio Clubs"), July 14, 1925, in GOljaeva 26-7. 
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reason for such attention to these clubs was that radio should play "as monumental means 
of agitatsia and propaganda. ,,42 
Pavel Mikhailovich Kerzhentsev, a theoretician of Soviet Culture and Chair of the 
Soviet Radio Committee, outlined the tasks of radio committees, explaining that radio 
and radio transmission obtained extremely political meanings: "the radio committees 
became the quickest political newspapers that reach out to the farthest comers of the 
Soviet Union faster than any other newspaper." He continues to explain that radio 
encouraged "self-education,,,43 as it transmitted works of literature and music, and 
through those, promoted intellectual relaxation. Radio became a lauded, versatile media 
form once its benefits were recognized, and "Next to mass media and film, radio is now 
the mightiest weapon of communist education for the masses.,,44 
In 1 924, Soviet Union began international radio broadcasting "as it is known 
today, in voice and intended for listeners with their own radio sets.,,45 Anatoly 
Vasilievich Lunacharsky, the Soviet People's Commissar for Education and 
Enlightenment, gave a radio lecture46 on November 23, 1 924 on the "Culture of the 
Soviet Union and the Importance of Radio.,,47 He spoke about the "magic abilities of 
radio" and encouraged people to "say that we will use it for the unification of people and 
exclaim 'hail to the radio! Hail to the continuing progress in the deep unification of 
Communism for the future victory on the arena of class struggle that will end with the 
42 Ibid, 27. 
43 P.M. Kerzhentsev, "Program Article," Govorit SSSR, 3 no. 1 (1934), I .  
44 Ibid. 
45 Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of West em Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse NY: Syracuse UP 1997), 3 . " , 
46 Pa,n,HOJ1eKl(HH 
47 «�YJ1bTypa CCCP H 3HaqeHHe pa,n,HO» ("Culture of the Soviet Union and the Importance of Radio"), November 23, 1924, in 
GOlJaeva 91. 
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creation of true human culture. ",48 He declared the importance of radio in the unification 
of workers and class struggle, and condemned bourgeois radio as an instrument of the 
system of lies that protects the ideas needed for the ruling class. But, Lunacharsky 
insisted, "we can reply to the bourgeois poison with a strong antidote provided by our 
Communist press, our Communist film, and our Communist radio ... we know that we will 
be able to clean radio from the stains put upon it by fatty bourgeois fingers. ,,49 In order to 
ensure that radio adhered to Communist goals and evaded capitalist corruption, the 
government considered it as an art form subject to Socialist Realism just as much as a 
novel, painting, or musical composition. 
The growth of radio coincided with the implementation of Socialist Realism as 
the only permitted method of artistic expression in the Soviet Union, and adjusted its 
broadcasting model according to the requirements outlined at the First Congress of Soviet 
Writers in 1934. Socialist Realism demanded of art the following four obligations: party 
loyalty (partiinost '), ideological commitment (idenost '), accessibility of the art form for 
the masses (narodnost '), and class-conscious works that supported the needs of the 
proletariat (klassovost '). 
Radio, by its very nature, epitomized the requirements of Socialist Realism. (I 
would argue that radio is truly the most ideal form of mass media for any ideological 
slant,50 as a stream of auditory programming does not have the physical or visual space 
that a book or film does in which to imbed suggestive plot details or make subversive 
visual juxtapositions. Radio has no mise en scene, but is a solitary stream, and in its 
limitations, radio asserts its power.) Since it moved from a private enterprise to state-run 
48 Ibid., 94. 
49 Ibid., 94. 
50 Including democratic, as will b� discussed within the context of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 
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political entity, radio necessarily promoted party loyalty: it was illegal and impossible to 
broadcast anything else. This can be extended to ideological commitment. As far as 
accessibility, the desirability of radio for the Soviet Union resided in its appeal to the 
broad masses. With no prerequisite of literacy or higher education, radio became a 
socially (but not politically) neutral mode of communication. 
In order to demonstrate true adherence to Socialist Realism, a work of art should 
have displayed versatility that would allow for a seamless transposition between various 
media forms. News printed in a physical newspaper should demonstrate the same 
accessibility and clarity as news over the radio; literature in books should be able to 
transition to an auditory narrative without any confusion. Thus, literature's role as 
propaganda increased as plots and didactic messages previously constrained within the 
pages of a book (and to the literate population) were broadcasted over the radio. In an 
article titled "The Writer and the Radio" in Govorit SSSR, an editorial explained: "Any 
good [italics are mine--LN] work of Soviet literature is easy to translnit. .. Usually this 
may result in shortening and simplifying some of the plot lines, but a good writer, a great 
Soviet writer, should be able to adapt his work to the conditions of radio transmission.,,51 
In collective reply to the editorial, Soviet writers such as Aleksei Tolstoy, Yuri Tynianov, 
and Mikhail Kazakov agreed that any important literary work should be transmittable by 
radio. 52 Transmissibility became a measurement of literary success, and since the 
adaptation of literature to radio required writing clearly and unambiguously, 
transmissibility became an egalitarian symbol of clarity and accessibility for everyone. 
51 Govorit SSSR, 19 ( 1934), 10. 
52 Govorit SSSR, 24 ( 1924), 5. 
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Literature was subordinated to the rules of radio transmission, and the methods of radio 
shaped the production of literature. 53 
In order to promote radio as a venue for literature, stations invited writers to 
produce pieces for the radio. Kerzhentsev writes, "The work for radio should be 
considered as extremely important so that the artists, writers, and musicians should feel 
proud and privileged to perform in front of the microphone.,,54 He insists that radio 
transmission of works of literature should demonstrate two qualities: they should be 
politically savvy and in tune with the demands of the time, and that "only those qualities 
will bring radio transmission to the same level as press.,,55 
In addition to involving writers in a relationship of reciprocity, radio stations also 
reached out to their audiences. 56 In the 1 930s, a new plane of communication was 
developed as stations solicited letters from radio listeners, connecting the audience not 
only on a political level but personal as well. Stations accepted letters from listeners, 
allowing an interactive experience with the media. In 1 933, the Radio Committee 
received 2-3,000 letters a month, and the following year, the number of letters jumped to 
22-25,000 letters a month, illustrating the growing popularity of both radio listening and 
listener involvement. 57 However, the widespread availability of radios did not always 
serve to further Communist ideals� Radio waves could also provide access to alternative 
voices, which spread knowledge that contradicted the Communist cause. 
As Michael Nelson points out, "The irony of international broadcasting is that 
what had been started by the Soviet Union ultimately became a significant factor in the 
53 A similar relationship can be seen with RFE/RL and the literature it broadcasted over the airwaves. Even dissident literature is 
necessarily subject to the time and sensory constraints of a radio broadcast. 
54 Kerzhentsev, "Program," 28. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Yuri Murashov, "Sovetskii etos i radiofikatsiia pis'ma." Novae literaturnoe obozrenie 86 (2007): 57. 
57 Murashov, "Sovetskii," 57. 
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regime's own downfall."s8 The same shortwave radios that were used to listen to Soviet 
broadcasts were eventually tuned into Western radio stations that contributed to the 
ideological battle between the Soviet Union and Western powers. "One of the 
peculiarities of Soviet space was its topological impermeability," explains Epstein, "the 
notion that it could be understood only 'from the inside.' It was assumed to be 
impenetrable to those located outside of it"S9 One of the successes of Radio Free Europe 
and Radio Liberty is that an "inside" perspective is exactly what they intended to 
broadcast. 
From their creation as Cold War institutions, Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty aimed to provide alternative broadcasts to people throughout the Soviet {.Inion 
and countries that fell victim to Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The stat1 0ns best 
exemplify the clandestine exchange of information to and from the Soviet Union and its 
Eastern European satellite states, when people and ideas silenced by the government 
found alternate outlets of expression. They were unique in that they intended to provide 
radio broadcasts that would act as surrogate home country programs, with regionally 
specific news, rather than channeling American news and views into the countries as did 
The Voice of America ( 1 942-present): "Only with Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty . . .  did a country establish broadcast services whose purpose was to change the 
form of government in foreign nations by airing news not about the country from which 
the broadcasts originated, but about the countries that were the broadcast targets.,,60 Thus, 
the broadcasting practices of these stations will be used as case studies to investigate how 
58 Nelson, War, 1. 
59 Mikhail Epstein, "Russo-Soviet Topoi," in The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space, eds. Evgeny 
Dobrenko and Eric Naiman, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 297. 60 Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, (Lexington, KY: The 
UP of Kentucky, 2000), S-6. 
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radio broadcasting led to the spread of democratic ideas in the Soviet Union and East 
European countries. 
J ames Critchlow describes how media transitioned when "wartime cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and its Western allies degenerated into Cold War tension. ,,61 In 
order to combat the growing power of Soviet media, Western governments started using 
shortwave radios and Britain and the United States began directly broadcasting into the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.62 Both The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
and The Voice of America (VOA) can be considered strictly "Western" broadcasting 
stations, as they spoke for their home countries (giving VOA something of an eponymous 
mission), while the United States-funded Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty served as 
"surrogate" home stations for the countries to which they broadcasted, "attempting to 
provide listeners with the kind of domestically oriented programs that they might expect 
from their own radio stations if the latter were free of censorship.,,63 
While the concept of giving "voice to the voiceless" is powerful on its own, the 
more immediate goal of RFE/RL--to provide news to countries where it is heavily 
censored--can also be counted as a great contributor to undermining the Soviet 
government. K.J. McNamara explains that behind every provider of alternative 
information is a source of authority (in the case of RFE/RL, this authority is the U. S. 
government).64 Communist governments, which "monopolize information in order to 
legitimize their power" are therefore compromised when a new source of information is 
present.65 Foreign broadcasts made available facts and news that Soviet media withheld 
61 James Critchlow, "Westem Cold War Broadcasting." Joumal of Cold War Studies 1 (1999): 168-75. 62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 2. 
64 KJ. McNamara, "Reaching Captive Minds with Radio." Orbis 36, no. 1 (1992): 31. 65 Ibid. 
17 
from the population, and by doing this, they undermined totalitarian regimes by "ending 
the information monopoly,,66 within the countries' borders. 
During World War II, the United States created a propaganda agency, the Office 
of War Information (OWl), and simultaneously created the VOA.67 When the war came 
to an end, the VOA's budget was significantly decreased, and there was unrest among 
Congress members who believed that the United States no longer had a role in 
international broadcasting.68 However, when the threat of Communism to the United 
States emerged from the Soviet Union and satellite countries of Eastern Europe, the 
United States saw an opportunity for a revised role in radio broadcasting. Since "the 
Soviets and local Communists moved expeditiously to silence opposition voices, 
eliminate an independent press, outlaw non-Communist political parties, neutralize 
religion, and seal off borders from foreign influence,,,69 General Lucius Clay announced 
the need for something other than Voice of America. He called for a station that did not 
j ust share news about America, but "would speak to each country behind the Iron Curtain 
in its own language, and from the throats of its own leaders who fled for their lives 
because of their beliefs in freedom." 70 While his call to order is rather grandiose and 
dramatic, this is indeed what the United States did with its new approach to international 
broadcasting. 
In considering why the United States government chose to continue international 
radio broadcasting as opposed to developing new technologies (television broadcasts, 
newspapers, etc.), the same issues present in the early days of Soviet Union reappear. 
66 Ibid., 32. 67 Puddington, Broadcasting, 7. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Nelson, War, 3 9. 
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Although the nations held different intentions with their broadcasts and began decades 
apart, the core benefits of radio maintained a high level of importance. While the Soviet 
Union overcame its geographical obstacle in uniting the country across a vast expanse of 
land, the United States faced a similar problem: in promoting the message of democracy, 
they were an ocean away. The struggle with literacy71 remained, as well as the issue of 
practicality: newspapers required significant amounts of materials and even more relevant 
to the American case, physical distribution. It would be both incredibly difficult 
(impossible) and dangerous for the citizens of countries to which the U.S. broadcasted if 
subversive newspapers were printed and passed out to the population.72 Further, there is 
something significant about the idea of simultaneous listening, even if only on a symbolic 
level. In the Soviet Union, people from Leningrad to Irkutsk to Vladivostock were united 
by listening to the Moscow news at the same time 73, providing the feeling that the 
country was not disjoint, but united in its struggle against bourgeois corruption. In the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, citizens faced unspeakable terror and persecution, and 
on a more superficial but no less important level was "how lonely everyone felt and how 
cut off from the greater tradition of Western learning and thought.,,74 With American 
broadcasts, tuning into foreign stations provided the hope that someone else was also 
listening--a hope that there was someone else with opposing ideas. Thus, an alternative 
community of free thinkers was proIT!pted. 
If propaganda is stripped of its Communist/Socialist connotations, then Soviet 
and American radio followed essentially the same process: in order to best "distribute" 
71 Moreover, since the U.S. broadcasted to multiple countries with multiple languages, radio again proved economical as instead of 
printing five different versions of the same news--a considerable use of capital--translators could instead be used. 
72 It is interesting to note that at one point, Radio Free Europe did have a balloon campaign, where they sent millions of leaflets across 
the border of the Iron Curtain. 
73 The news was always broadcasted according to Moscow time. 
74 Marcin Krol, "Listening through the Jamming." American Scholar 61, no. 3 (1992) : 2. 
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propaganda, each nation turned to the powerful force of radio. This is true for RFE/RL as 
well as VOA and BBC, but RFE/RL departs from other western stations in that they did 
not simply use the Soviet Union's mass media of choice against the government who first 
advocated radio, but also their own citizens. 
The sizable population of displaced people following WWII--people who escaped 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to major international cities--presented an 
opportunity for the U.S. government to use them as a "powerful force against their 
communist controlled homelands.,,75 The NCFE recognized an opportunity to establish 
mutually beneficial relationships with refugees: in exchange for employment, the 
population of emigres could provide an invaluable wealth of knowledge: "Many of the 
refugees had been leaders in the societies from which they had emigrated, and their 
backgrounds could be used to obtain a better understanding of the techniques and devices 
that were being used by the Communists to undermine the democratic governments.,,76 
Emigres were valuable not only in their oppositional views to their former govermnents, 
but also because they provided the ultimate source of cultural knowledge and kne�N ho,,,, 
to "appeal to their former fellow citizens.,,77 George Kennan, often called "the father of 
our project,,78 even though he was never officially affiliated with the radios, spearheaded 
the creation of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), asking Ambassador 
Joseph Grew to organize civilians into an anticommunist organization "that was 
dedicated to returning democracy to Eastern Europe, using the talents of the refugees.,,79 
�: C!ssie. Dore Hill, "Vo�ces of Hope: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty." Hoover Digest, no. 4 (2001), 1. 77 Slg MIckelson, Amenca's Oth.er Voice: The StOIY of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1983) 2. 78 Jame� L. Tyson, U.S.  InternatIOnal Broadcasting and National Security, (New York, NY: Ramapo P, 1983) 89. Puddmgton, Broadcasting, 8 79 Hill, "Voices," I .  
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In 1949, The NCFE,8o initially headed by Allen Dulles and then by Joseph Grew,81 
announced its official objectives as an organization. 
The goal of the radios was not limited to providing truthful news, "but also to 
bring about the peaceful demise of the Communist system and the liberation of what were 
known as satellite nations.,,82 In order to do so, the NCFE made it apparent that exile 
relations were a main priority,83 and initial radi084 plans were quite simple: exiled leaders 
and scholars85 were provided with microphones and "given free rein to speak to their 
countrymen.,,86 The outlined plan for the exiles can be summarized into three main goals: 
to find occupations for the exiles, to put their voices on the air, and to allow the exiles to 
experience democracy.87 The latter goal is rather vague, but to extrapolate further, the 
government wanted exiles to see democracy "in action," with the hope that this would 
add credibility to the broadcasts. Rather than simply being seen as disaffected exiles from 
the USSR and Eastern Europe, what a testament to democracy if they were also 
converted! Radio Free Europe (RFE) executives recruited nationals from the five 
countries to which the station intended to broadcast: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania.88 
RFE employed emigres abroad and in the United States, though the station widely 
drew upon the population in New York, as it was "the preferred destination for those 
among the intellectual elite who were fed up with Soviet restrictions, Soviet censorship, 
80 Initially known as the Free Europe Committee (FEC). 
81 In addition to Dulles and Grewe, the board comprised powerful and influential members, among them Dwight Eisenhower, fonner 
attorney general Francis Biddle, Dewitt Wallace (owner of Reader's Digest), and Henry Luce of Time, Inc. 
82 Puddington, Broadcasting, X. 
83 Ibid., 12. 
84 In addition to radio broadcasting, there was also a publishing division of the Free Europe Committee called Free Europe Press. 
85 In Scaling the Wall: Talking to Eastern Europe--The Best of Radio Free Europe, George Urban notes that East European 
intellectuals were not only engaged by means of employment, they also served as an audience for RFE's broadcasts. In addition to 
news broadcasting, RFE transmitted educational lectures. 
86 Puddington, Broadcasting 17. 
87 Nelson, War, 41. 
88 Ibid., 46. 
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Soviet poverty, and especially, Soviet hypocrisy." 89 RFE could recruit from a talented 
population of reporters, writers, poets, musicians, and commentators, who having been 
grudging adherents to the Soviet system, were willing to discuss the negative attributes 
and the "facts about the natural disasters and man-made catastrophes that were 
systematically covered up by Soviet authorities.,,9o The relationship between RFE and the 
emigre population (while some may call it exploitative) involved a fair amount of 
reciprocity, as "Radio Free Europe was a very important--for some the sole--source of 
income,,91 for Polish, Hungarian, and Czech writers and intellectuals in exile. 
RFE's first official broadcastwas on July 4,92 1950 from West Germany, though 
it was "little more than an announcement of the impending commencement of regular 
programming" which began on July 14 on Bastille Day, significant in Europe as Jay of 
revolution against tyranny.93 The first broadcasts were sent to Czechoslovakia, and then 
later in the year to Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.94 The next year on May 1 
(symbolic as May Day is a workers' holiday and particularly important in Communist 
countries) broadcasting began from a larger transmission facility in Holzkirchen, 
Germany� near Munich.95 Munich eventually became the official headquarters of RFE for 
a variety of reasons: it was convenient and necessary to have a European production site, 
West Germany shared a border with Czechoslovakia and Poland so it was geographically 
strategic, and many emigres lived there. 
The NCFE was funded through the CIA (by Congress) unti11972, but preferred to 
present itself as a private enterprise funded by the donations of Americans dedicated to 
89 Puddington, Broadcasting, X 
90 Ibid. 
91 Krol, "Listening," 2. 
92 This date was chosen for obvious symbolic reasons. 
93 Puddington, Broadcasting, 18. 
94 Hill, "Voices," 2. 
95 Where RFE/RL was headquartered until its move to Prague. 
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the cause of freedom. A New York Times article explains, "Radio Free Europe, which 
went on the air on July 4, and is scheduled to begin regular operations on July 14, 
promises to be one of the unique operations in the history of broadcasting. Financed as a 
private venture by a group of American citizens, [italics are mine--LN] with the public at 
large invited to participate through individual subscription, the outlet is designed to be 
'the voice of freedom. ,,,96 To emphasize the supposed private investment into the NCFE, 
another organization--the Crusade for Freedom--was created to encourage even more 
funding for Radio Free Europe.97 The Crusade's "mascot" was a 1 O-ton bell with a 
"laurel wreath symbolizing peace encircling the top and a frieze of five figures 
representing the five races of humankind passing the torch of freedom.,,98 The committee 
displayed the bell throughout cities in America,99 rallying citizens who believed in the 
values set forth by Radio Free Europe, and securing funding that although not enough to 
contribute substantially, did demonstrate the public support of the Crusade. 
Accompanying the parades were pithy slogans: 100 "Fight the Big Lie with the Big Truth" 
and "Help Truth Fight Communism,,,IOl and Americans signed "freedom scrolls" and 
contributed "truth dollars.,,102 
As RFE successful gained listeners in Eastern Europe and tensions increased 
between the United States and USSR, the CIA resolved to pursue a similar endeavor in 
the Soviet Union, and thus was born RFE's sister station Radio Liberty. Prior to Radio 
Liberty's first broadcast, John Foster Dulles (president-elect Dwight Eisenhower's 
96 Jack Gould. "RADIO FREE EUROPE; A Unique Private Enterprise Is Set Up To Pierce Russia's Iron Curtain Channels Set-Up 
Craftsmanship Unity." The New York Times 9 July 1950. 
97 Hill, "Voices," 2. 
98 Hill, "Voices," 2. 
99 It was later pelmanently installed in West Berlin. 
IO() Comparable to the simple, powetful messages present in Soviet propaganda! 101 Hill, "Voices," 2. 
102 Nelson, War, 48. 
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secretary of state designate) appealed before senate, asking for "liberation of the captive 
peoples. ,,103 In early March, 1 953 under the auspices of the American Committee for the 
Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Amcomlib), Radio Liberation (eventually changed to 
Radio Liberty) debuted. 104 Soon after its first few broadcasts, Radio Liberty, was 
confronted with the story of Stalin's death on March 5, 1 953,  assigning it the symbolic 
meaning of an end of an era of Terror. 
In order to illustrate the "duality" of RFE/RL's broadcasting--that is, the radios 
broadcasted both from the United States as a foreign news source as well as broadcasting 
"internal" information, such as literature--a discussion of samizdat105 literature is helpful. 
Samizdat included works of political dissent, "but also included literary works that failed 
to receive the official seal of approval, as well as information on human rightS.,, 1 06 The 
idea of samizdat translated into other forms of media, including radio, resulting in the 
term radizdat. 1 07 Often, these samizdat publications would be smuggled to the West. 
Radio Liberty had an archive of these materials, and also broadcasted some of the 
documents over the air, right back to the public who was denied access to these works by 
the Soviet government. 
Radio Liberty in particular served an important role for dissident Soviet writers 
who could not publish their works through government-supported presses: the station 
frequently broadcasted samizdat writings and collected an important archive of samizdat 
works in Munich. Radio Liberty published samizdat documents in weekly bulletins over 
1 03 James Critchlow, Radio Hole-in-the-Head: An Insiders StOry of Cold War Broadcasting, (Washington, D.C: American UP, 1995), 
2. 
104. J:Iill p�stulates t�1at the reason Radio Liberty is even less known than RFE is because there was no "fanfare, promotion, and fund­
ralsmg WIth celebnty chainnen" (4). Rather, Radio Liberty maintained a low profile. 
105 Translated fr�m ��ssian, samizdat means "self-printed" and the tenn is applicable to underground, clandestine publications that 
were created by mdtvlduals, rather than presses and illegally circulated. 106 �. Eugene Palta, Discovering the Hidden Listener An Assessment of Radio Liberty And Western Broadcasting to the USSR 
Dunng the Cold War (New York: Hoover Institution Press Publication, 2007), 52. 1 07 F.J. M .  Feldbrugge, Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union, (Netherlands: A.W. SiJ' thoff lnternational Company B V 1975), 4. ' . . , 
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the radio (Materialy SamizdatalMaterials of Samizdat) .108
' 
The words of authors like 
Boris Pasternak, Joseph Brodsky, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Siniavskii, and 
countless others were broadcasted over the radio, presenting a revolutionary alternative to 
printed samizdat material. 109 Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago was serialized and 
broadcasted on RFE's Polish Service in I 5-minute intervals.l l o Marcin Krol remembers 
hearing Witold Gombrowicz and Czeslaw Milosz who may have been "entirely forgotten 
but for the opportunity to communicate with their countrymen over Radio Free 
Europe.,,111 While in many ways it can be argued that RFE/RL essentially "preached to 
the converted,,,112 this in no way underscores its importance. For many listeners of 
RFE/RL, "the broadcasts were their only contact with the outside world,,113 The great 
success of RFE/RL even apart from its contribution to the downfall of the USSR is that it 
raised awareness about an alternative thought venue, and people who held subversive 
views were connected in a community of listeners with the potential to eventually bring 
recognition to their struggles.114 
RFE and RL did not broadcast without opposition from the target countries.115 
From the beginning of its broadcasts, RFE "became the fiercely hated enemy of all 
totalitarian leaders in Eastern Europe.,,116 Within seconds of Radio Liberty'S broadcasts 
in 1 953117, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries reacted by jamming the 
radio waves: on the same frequencies as the radio stations, they simultaneously 
108 Ibid., 7. 109 Printed samizdat works were often hand-written on carbon-copy paper and passed from reader to reader, a dangerous method of 
transport. 
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1 14 McNamara, "Reaching," 26. 
l i S A fascinating and important facet of RFE/RL history that cannot fit within the space limits is the chain of bizarre sabotage that 
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broadcasted shrieks, howls, or white noise ("KGB jazz,,118) which effectively garbled 
RFE and RL's  transmissions.119 Krol asserts that the importance of RFE120 can be seen in 
the reaction Communist powers had to the broadcasting--they did everything in their 
power to stop the transmissions.121 He recalls his father listening to the radio and hearing 
"enormous screeches, drumming sounds, and mysterious bleeps . . .  until, finally, father 
found what he wanted.,,122 However, even the jamming served to have a "positive effect 
on morale for us in Munich," according to James Critchlow.123 
Although the Soviet Union and East European countries attelnpted to block out 
the transmissions from RFE/RL, people were still able to tune into the stations. Gene 
Sosin argues that the regime could have "saved millions of rubles in electronic costs and 
man hours simply by confiscating all radios and using loudspeakers exclusively." 124 
However, the vast network of personal radios throughout the Soviet Bloc made this 
highly impractical. By taking away the population's  personal radios, Communist 
governments would not only remove the influence of RFE/RL: they would also 
effectually remove their own strategic placement in the homes of their citizens, taking the 
history of radio full circle. 
In a celebratory speech for the tenth anniversary of Soviet broadcasting, Lenin l s 
widow, Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, elucidates radio 's  continued strengths while 
simultaneously comparing Soviet radio to radio broadcasts of capitalist countries: "Radio 
broadcasting is of enormous importance. It takes out of oblivion the most far removed 
118 McNamara, "Reaching," 27. 1 19 Hill, "Voices," 5. 120 Krol considers RFE to be the "most brilliant move against communism--more important, in [his] view, than embargoes, nuclear 
weapons, and various diplomatic and military pressures" (1). 121 Krol, "Listening," 431. 122 Ibid., 432. 123 Critchlow, Radio Hole-in-the-Head, 67. 124 Gene Sosin, Sparks of Liberty: An Insider's Memoir of Radio Liberty, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1999), 14-15. 
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comers of the USSR. It brings knowledge into the broad masses, it propagates, helps the 
masses to organize themselves anew . .  . If in the capitalist countries radio broadcasting 
disorients and disorganizes masses, in the Soviet Union, the radio remains a great 
instrument of Socialist construction.,,125 Her words can be considered premonitory: while 
the Soviet Union and East European countries utilized radio as a constructive tool, 
Western stations such as RFE/RL hijacked the radio infrastructure and methods created 
by Soviet and East European governments, and used them to perpetuate their own form 
of propaganda. Despite the Soviet Union's attempts to continue its task of nation 
building, capitalist broadcasts from RFE/RL undermined totalitarian governments and 
disorganized their listeners. 
RFE/RL aimed to tell the truth, as well as provide a voice for the opposition. They 
broadcasted not as American stations (though they most certainly adhered to democratic 
ideals), but as "surrogate" stations that catered news and broadcasts to citizens living in 
each country to which RFE/RL broadcasted. To further the potency of their broadcasts, 
they utilized the cultural knowledge and experience of a sizable emigre community. 
While its role in the dissolution of the USSR is debated, RFE/RL smartly capitalized on 
elements of Soviet system: the emigre population and methods of broadcasting that Lenin 
himself advocated. Using former Soviet and East European citizens against their former 
homelands, and further, using the media form developed and advocated by Lenin himself 
to promote an anti-Communist dialog, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty eventual 
produced a mutual process ofbroadcasting--the Soviet Bloc was able to hear the world, 
and the world was able to hear the Soviet Bloc. 
125 «npHBeTCTBHe no cJIyqalO 1 0-JIeTHH coeTcKoro pa.nHoBemaHHH» ("CelebratOly Speech for the 10th Anniversary of Soviet 
Broadcasting"), 1 934, in Gorjaeva 363. 
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